Fuller y Kelsen - Fuller sobre Kelsen
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La relación entre Lon Fuller y Hans Kelsen es compleja e importante, pero ha sido poco estudiada. Fuller, el filósofo estadounidense del derecho más importante durante el tiempo de Kelsen, no solo conocía su fama y escritos, sino que también fue comprensivo con su situación personal. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, Fuller empleó a Kelsen como su punto de apoyo para atacar al positivismo jurídico; inclusive parece desempeñar un papel substancial en la relativa invisibilidad de Kelsen, aún hoy en día, para la filosofía del derecho de Norteamérica. Este artículo busca explorar y explicar la compleja relación entre estos dos importantes personajes.
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