Realism and cognitivism(s)
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Abstract
It is very common to consider that Legal Realism as a legal theory defends a non-cognitivist position in ethics and linguistic matter. In this paper, I argue that the link is only of a pragmatic nature and therefore unnecessary. There may be good reasons, even when adhering to cognitivism, or one of its variations, to defend a realistic position in legal theory. On the other hand, adhesion to any form of cognitivism is insufficient to invalidate realism in legal theory.
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References
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