Bostock: un caso de discriminación laboral
Contenido principal del artículo
Resumen
En sentido estricto, Bostock no es un caso constitucional. Más bien, es un caso de derecho laboral: más concretamente, un despido discriminatorio. Neil Gorsuch, que escribe para la mayoría de la Corte Roberts, limita la cuestión a la interpretación de la Ley de Derechos Civiles (1964), sin desarrollar un verdadero “argumento constitucional”. Desde la perspectiva del razonamiento jurídico, Bostock es una decisión originalista. Tanto la opinión mayoritaria como las opiniones discrepantes de Samuel Alito y Brett Kavanaugh son intentos de reconstruir y aplicar el significado original de la locución “por razón de sexo”. En esta decisión se entrecruzan varias formas de originalismo: hay un choque entre la doctrina textualista, por un lado, y la doctrina del significado público combinada con argumentos basados en la intención, por el otro. Pero, en realidad, el textualismo de la opinión mayoritaria parece “disfrazar” una interpretación dinámica y evolutiva que actualiza el sentido original de la Ley de Derechos Civiles, para incluir la orientación sexual en la protección contra las discriminaciones por razón de sexo. Combinada con otras decisiones recientes, Bostock parece formar parte de una estrategia más amplia de la Corte Roberts, orientada a la sistematización de la ley federal en el ámbito de la discriminación laboral.
Descargas
Detalles del artículo
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial 4.0.
Citas
Fuentes doctrinales
BARNES, Randy, “¿Neil Gorsuch? The Surprise behind the Supreme Court's Surprising LGBTQ Decision”, The Washington Post (16 de junio de 2020, 8:06 PM).
BARRETT, Amy Coney, “Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty”, Constitutional Commentary, No. 32, 2017.
BENNETT, Robert W., “The Mission of Moral Reasoning in Constitutional Law, 58 Southern California Law Review (S. Cal. L. Rev), 1985, pp. 647-660.
BERGER, Raoul, Government by Judiciary, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1977.
BERGER, Raoul, “Original Intention in Historical Perspective”, The George Washington Law Review (Geo. Wash. L. Rev.), No. 54, 1986, pp. 296-337.
BICKEL, Alexander M., The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, Evanston y Londres, Harper & Row Publ., Nueva York, 1970.
BICKEL, Alexander M., The Least Dangerous Branch, Yale University Press, New Haven y Londres, 1986.
BOBBITT, Philip C., Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982.
BORK, Robert H., “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems”, Indiana Law Journal (Ind. L. J.), No. 147, 1971, pp. 1-35.
BORK, Robert H. “Discurso ante la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de San Diego (18 de noviembre de 1985)”, reimpreso en The Great Debate. Interpreting our Written Constitution, en The Federalist Society, No. 45, Washington DC, 1986.
BORK, Robert H., “The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights”, San Diego Law Review (San Diego L. Rev.), No. 23, 1986, pp. 823-832.
BORK, Robert H., The Tempting of America, The Free Press, Nueva York, 1990.
BRATMAN, Michael E., Faces of Intention, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
BREST, Paul, “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding”, Boston University Law Review (Bu. L Rev), No. 60, 1980, pp. 204-238.
BREST, Paul, “Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive”, The Supreme Court Review (Sup. Ct. Rev.), 1971, pp. 95-131.
BIRD, Robert C., “More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act”, William & Mary Journal of Race, Gender, and Social Justice (Wm. & Mary J. Women & L.), No. 3, 1997, pp. 137-161.
BRUDNEY, James J. & Lawrence BAUM, “Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras”, William and Mary Law Review (Wm. & Mary L. Rev.), No. 55, 2013, pp. 483-580.
CHEMERINSKY, Erwin, Federal Jurisdiction, Aspen Publishers, Nueva York, 2012.
CHIASSONI, Pierluigi, “El textualismo razonable: una tentación resistible”, en Antonin SCALIA, Una cuestión de interpretación. Los tribunales federales y el derecho, Palestra, Lima.
COLBY, Thomas B. & Peter J. SMITH, “Living Originalism”, Duke Law Journal (Duke L J), No. 59, 2009, pp. 239-307.
DWORKIN, Ronald, “The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve”, Fordham Law Review (Fordham L. Rev.), No. 65, 1997, pp. 1249-1268.
DWORKIN, Ronald, Law's Empire, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1986.
ELY, John H., Democracy and Distrust, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 1980.
ESKRIDGE, William N. Jr., “Dynamic Statutory Interpretation”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review (U. Pa. L. Rev.), No. 135, 1986/1987, pp. 1479-1555.
FALLON, Richard H. Jr., “The Many and Varied Roles of History in Constitutional Adjudication”, Notre Dame Law Review (Notre Dame L. Rev.), No. 90, 2015, pp. 1753-1834.
FALLON, Richard H. Jr., “Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent”, Harvard Law Review, No. 130, 2016, pp. 523-589.
FISH, Stanley, “Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak's Purposive Interpretation in Law”, Cardozo Law Review (Cardozo L. Rev.), No. 29, 2008, pp. 1109-1146.
FLEMING, James E., “Are We All Originalists Now? I hope not!”, Texas Law Review, No. 91, pp. 1785-1813.
FRIED, Barbara H., The Progressive Assault to Laissez Faire, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA), 2001.
GEIS, Michael L., “The Meaning of Meaning in the Law”, Washington University Law Quarterly (Wash. U. L. Q.), No. 73, pp. 1125-1144.
GILBERT, Margaret, Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.
GOLDSWORTHY, Jeffrey, “Dworkin as an Originalist”, Constitutional Commentary, No. 17, 2000, pp. 49-78.
GORSUCH, Neil, A Republic, If You Can Keep It, Crown Publishing, Nueva York, 2019.
GROVE, Tara L., “Which Textualism?”, Harvard Law Review, No. 134, pp. 265-307.
KAY, Richard S., “Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses”, Nw. U. L. Rev., No. 82, 1988, pp. 226-292.
KOPPELMAN, Andrew, “Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive Moves”, Minnesota Law Review, Nos. 20-16, 2020, pp. 1-42.
KUSHNER, James A., “Substantive Equal Protection: The Rehnquist Court and the Fourth Tier of Judicial Review”, Missouri Law Review (Mo. L. Rev.), No. 53, 1988, pp. 423-463.
LUND, Nelson, “Unleashed and Unbound: Living Textualism in Bostock v. Clayton County”, Federalist Society Review, No. 21, 2020, pp. 176-185.
MAGGS, Gregory E., “A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution”, The George Washington L. Rev., No. 80, 2012, pp. 1707-1750.
MANNING, John F., “Textualism and Legislative Intent”, Virginia Law Review (Va. L. Rev.), No. 91, 2005, pp. 419-492.
MANNING, John F., “Second-Generation Textualism”, California Law Review (Cal. L. Rev.), No. 98, 2010, pp. 1287-1318.
MCCONNELL, Michael W., “Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past”, The George Washington Law Review, No. 66, 1998, pp. 1127-1140.
MCGINNIS, John O. y Michael B. RAPPAPORT, “Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case against Construction”, Northwestern University Law Review, No. 103, 2009, pp. 751-802.
MEESE, Edwin III, “U.S. Attorney General, Speech before the American Bar Association” (Jul. 9, 1985).
MELVIN, Edward J., “Judicial Activism - The Violation of an Oath”, The Catholic Lawyer (Cath. Law.), No. 27, 1992, pp. 283-300.
MOURITSEN, Stephen C. & Thomas R. LEE, “Judging Ordinary Meaning”, The Yale Law Journal (Yale L. J.), No. 127, 2018, pp. 788-878.
MULHERN, Peter J., “In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1988, pp. 98-176.
NELSON, Caleb, “¿What Is Textualism?”, Virginia Law Review, No. 91, 2005, pp. 347-418.
NELSON, Caleb, “Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose”, New York University Law Review (N.Y.L. Rev.), No. 83, 2008, pp. 1784-1882.
POSNER, Richard A., “Statutory Interpretation- in the Classroom and in the Courtroom”, University of Chicago Law Review (U. Chi. L. Rev), No. 50, 1983, pp. 800-822.
POSNER, Richard A., Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, Harvard University Press, Boston (MA), 2003.
RAKOVE, Jack N., Original Meanings. Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution, Random House, Nueva York, 1997.
REHNQUIST, William H., “The Notion of a Living Constitution”, Texas Law Review (Tex. L. R.), No. 54, 1976, pp. 693-706.
RICHARDS, David, Foundations of American Constitutionalism, Oxford University Press, Nueva York, 1989.
SCALIA, Antonin, “Originalism; The Lesser Evil”, University of Cincinnati Law Review (U. Cin. L. Rev.), No. 57, 1989, pp. 849-863.
SCALIA, Antonin, “Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws”, en Amy GUTMANN (Ed.), A Matter of Interpretation, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
SCALIA, Antonin, A Matter of Interpretation, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997.
SCALIA, Antonin, &. Bryan A. GARNER, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, Thomson West, St. Paul, 2012.
SHEPSLE, Kenneth A., “Congress Is a ‘They’, Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron”, International Review of Law and Economics (Int'l Rev. L. & Econ.), No. 12, 1992, pp. 239-256.
SOLUM, Lawrence B., Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, Cornell University Press, Ithaca (NY), 2011.
SOLUM, Lawrence B., “Originalism and Constitutional Construction”, Fordham Law Review, No. 82, 2013, pp. 453-537.
STRAUSS, David A., The Living Constitution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.
SZYMANSKI, Charles, “The United States in step with the European Union: the Inclusion of Sexual Orientation in Anti-discrimination Law”, Diritti, lavoro, mercati, 2020, pp. 539-557.
TIEFER, Charles, “The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme Court”, Wisconsin Law Review (Wis. L. Rev.), No. 2000, 2000, pp. 205-277.
TUSHNET, Mark, Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law, Harvard University Press, Boston, 1988.
WALD, Patricia M., “Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term”, Iowa Law Review (Iowa L. R.), No. 68, 1983, pp. 195-216.
WEST, Robin L., “The Authoritarian Impulse in Constitutional Law”, University of Miami Law Review (U. Miami L. Rev.), No. 42, 1988, pp. 531-552.
WHITTINGTON, Keith E., “Dworkin's Originalism. The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation”, The Review of Politics, No. 62, 2000, pp. 297-229.
WINKLER, Adam, “Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in Federal Courts”, en Vanderbilt Law Review, No. 59, 2006, pp. 793-871.
ZANON, Nicolò, “Che significa discriminare perché di sex? en Bostock v. Clayton County una singolare controversia tra originalisti”, Quaderni Costituzionali, No. 4, 2020, pp. 839-842.
ZEPPOS, Nicholas S., “Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation”, Vanderbilt Law Review, No. 76, 1990, pp. 1335-1360.
Fuentes jurisprudenciales
P. v. S. y Cornwall Country Council (asunto C-13/94).
Babb v. Wilkie, 589 U.S. (2020).
Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia 590 U.S. 2020.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190.
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Burnwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 573 U.S. 682.
Comcast v. National Association of African-American-Owned Media, 589 U.S. (2020).
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (SCALIA, J., concurrente).
District of Columbia v. Heller 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs, Inc. 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (Kennedy, J.).
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-6294, 2012 WL 6930302 (10th. Cir. Dec. 20, 2012).
Home Bldg. & Loean Assn v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (Southerland, J., disidente).
Hosanna- Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U. S. 171, 196 (2012).
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982).
Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. (2020).
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996).
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n. 21 (1977).